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David Henige has accused the library research community of claiming validity 
for research that, in fact, is no better than unjustified belief. Not only is most 
library research of this genre, claims Henige, but this fact may be clouded by 
tables of statistics that leave the reader comfortable in the notion that the 
conclusions are valid. He further claims that the research community has not 
been called upon to account for such shoddy research.  
Qualitative Judgments and Self-Validation  
 
Henige's case in point is the RLG Conspectus. According to him it is a perfect 
example of unjustified belief and the fallacious use of numbers and statistics. At 
the risk of putting words in Henige's mouth, we would like to restate the core of 
his argument. His first point is that numerical rankings of collections don't 
measure anything. What the Conspectus calls a "research level" is oranges, 
while what it calls an "instruction level" is apples. This being the case, any 
attempt to rank collections is subjective in the extreme. Any attempt to verify 
those rankings by counting the number of volumes in the collection is only 
begging the question. His second complaint is that verification attempts have 
been "selfvalidating" in that they have attempted to define the five collection 
levels by averaging the intra-level self-reported rankings, a process Henige 
terms "grading on the curve."1
Having proposed this several years ago, Henige now finds it not just 
disappointing but disconcerting that no one has either supported or opposed him 
in print. This is just further evidence, he suggests, that the library research 
community is unconcerned with directly falsifying or substantiating claims 
about the validity of the Conspectus.  
Library research does not go unchallenged, however, when it treats important 
topics. The Pittsburgh study by Allen Kent et al. and Michael Harris's  
thesis on American public libraries drew a host of critics. True, the Conspectus 
has not elicited a flood of articles; but claims for and against its validity have 
been made. For instance, Paul Mosher and Nancy Gwinn have used a historical 
justification for the qualitative nature of the instrument.2 They argue that the 
quantitative collection evaluations of the 1950s and 1960s failed to produce 
usable results. Mosher also disputes Robert Downs' rationale for quantitative 
assessments. Two published articles have raised questions about the 
measurability of collection strengths. Stewart Saunders et al. published a study 
demonstrating the difficulty of identifying subject collections,3 and Ross 
Atkinson showed that "instruction level" and "research level" collections used 
two different measures.4  
Henige does not agree that the RLG Collection Management and 
Development Committee had some legitimate reasons for including qualitative 
factors in the evaluation. From the Committee's point of view, a shelflist count 
contains many discrepancies due to varying practices among libraries. In 
addition, in most cases it does not account for newspaper, journal, microform, 
and manuscript collections. The alternative to a quantitative measure is by 
definition qualitative-in this case the judgment of an expert. Henige might allow 
that an assessment of a collection's quality is a desirable goal, but he would also 
argue that existing quality assessments are too subjective to have any meaning. 
He points out that libraries with similar collections sometimes arrive at widely 
divergent ratings of their strength levels. Henige is correct in noting that having 
rejected an absolute quantitative evaluation, it makes no sense to adopt selected 
quantitative measures to verify the judgment in any absolute sense.  
Subjectivity and Probability 
   Henige has found the whole effort of subjectively evaluating the strengths of a  
collection to be messy and full of imponderables, and therefore of highly 
dubious value. But is this the same thing as saying that the method lacks 
epistemological validity?  
In the everyday world we make decisions in situations of uncertainty. We 
make those decisions by assigning a subjective probability to the likelihood that 
a given proposition is true or false. In the field of statistics, objective 
probabilities are determined through repeated trials, but most of life's situations 
do not allow for repeated trials. In most situations people assign subjective 
probabilities simply in order to act. The United States is out of the economic 
recession of 1990/91, true or false? There are multiple measures of economic 
recessions, but economists set discount rates based on their subjective 
assessment of the probability that this statement is true. Leonard Savage has 
shown that under appropriate conditions these subjective probabilities have 
many of the features of objective probabilities.5 For instance, he has 
demonstrated that it is possible to make a subjective but valid assertion that 
P(A)>P(B)-that is, the probability of A is greater than the probability of B-just 
from the conditions of the situation. In the situation under discussion, it is 
possible to state (without knowing either the subject of a collection or the library 
at which it is located) that P(level=2 or level=3)>P(level=1 or 
level=4)>P(level=0 or level=5) just from the internal logic of the Conspectus. 
Once there is some knowledge about the collection, these probabilities can be re-
vised. Verification studies do not really verify anything; rather they help us to 
revise the probability of a prior assessment. This is the standard procedure used 
in statistical decision theory.  
Probabilistic belief as a foundation for knowledge is not too different from the 
“justified true belief” theory cited by Henige. It requires an honest effort on the 
part of the believer and a rational weighing of the evidence. But let's look at the 
belief on which the believer is weighing odds; in what sense can it be true or 
false if it cannot be defined? No doubt Henige would argue that since the 
essence of what it means "to be a level 4" cannot be defined, then to state that 
"such and such a collection is a level 4" has no truth value. A proposition must 
have a truth value in order to use subjective probabilities.  
 Meeting Needs in the Real World  
 
Collection strengths, like many other entities in society, are culturally defined. 
They have a certain definition by the consent of the community. Ross Atkinson 
states that the numerical rankings in the Conspectus statements are initially 
meaningless symbols. He uses the term autoclarification to describe how over 
time they gradually acquire meaning through use.6 When a bibliographer asserts, 
"the collection on medieval architecture is a level 4," he or she asserts "I have a 
high degree of confidence (probability) that were my colleagues at other 
institutions to evaluate this collection, they would be in general agreement that it 
merits a level 4." That is all the Conspectus claims to say or can say.  
Readers may remember the collapse of the farm credit system a number of 
years ago. Few, if any, agricultural economists predicted it. Some observers 
commented that the economists were all too busy running their closed logic 
models on computers to be aware of events in the real world. The Conspectus is 
an attempt to meet the needs of cooperative collection building in the real world. 
It is legitimate for a kibitzer to critique the Conspectus from the vantage of a 
closed model, but those who are responsible for meeting the needs of collection 
development must make decisions in situations of uncertainty.  
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